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KROGER REDUX
JOHN B. OAKLEY†
INTRODUCTION
I applaud Professor Hartnett for raising an important point con-
cerning the application and effect of the American Law Institute’s
(ALI) proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1 His point is one that I
did not consider in my commentary accompanying that draft statute,
and I am grateful for the opportunity now to respond. It is both the
goal and the virtue of the ALI’s approach to law reform that its pro-
posals invite critical review even after the Institute has completed its
work. The Institute’s recommendations are just that: specific, con-
crete proposals laid on the table, as it were, for potential legislative
enactment or judicial adoption. They neither claim nor deserve im-
munity from continuing inspection. The fact that the ALI’s proposals
lack any self-executing legal effect assures an interval for reconsidera-
tion after the Institute has completed formal action, free of the inertia
that attaches to a statute or precedent once written into law. If they
can be improved by criticism and responsive proposals advanced be-
fore enactment or adoption, so much the better.
Professor Hartnett’s concern is a substantial one. To fully appre-
ciate its substance requires elaboration of just what “the Kroger rule”
is. Professor Hartnett notes that both the present § 1367 and the
ALI’s proposed substitute “are designed to embody the Kroger rule’s
denial of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against
third-party defendants impleaded by defendants”2—that is, impleaded
by what might be called the “original defendant” against whom the
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1. Edward A. Hartnett, Would the Kroger Rule Survive the ALI’s Proposed Revision of
§ 1367?, 51 DUKE L.J. 647 (2001).
2. Id. at 651.
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plaintiff filed the complaint commencing a civil action (based solely
on diversity jurisdiction) in a federal district court. Professor Hartnett
goes on to state that the “[t]he current § 1367 achieves this goal rather
straightforwardly. It denies supplemental jurisdiction in diversity
cases over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties pursuant
to Rule 14. Although the current § 1367 has its problems, failure to
maintain the Kroger rule is not one of them.”3
I disagree. I think the current § 1367’s method of codifying the
Kroger rule, by flatly forbidding the exercise of supplemental jurisdic-
tion in a diversity case over any claim by a plaintiff against a party
joined under Rule 14,4 is indeed problematic. It codifies a broader
conception of the Kroger rule than either the facts or the reasoning of
Kroger support;5 the ALI’s proposed statute was intended to cure this
overinclusiveness. I do agree, however, that Professor Hartnett has
discovered a significant problem with the ALI’s alternative approach.
The proposed text of the ALI’s statute would codify an even nar-
rower conception of the Kroger rule than the ALI intended. The un-
derinclusiveness of the ALI’s alternative approach to codifying the
Kroger rule needs to be either fixed or justified.
In Part I, I discuss the problem with the current § 1367’s codifica-
tion of the Kroger rule and the ALI’s attempted rectification of that
problem. In Part II, I set forth three possible responses: retaining the
current § 1367 (an option I reject out of hand), remedying the prob-
lem with the ALI’s statute, or rehabilitating the ALI’s statute by re-
thinking the Kroger rule. In Part III, I discuss the remedial alterna-
tive, offering curative language that, if added to the ALI’s statute,
would make its reach match the ALI’s aim. In Part IV, I take up the
rehabilitative alternative. I reconsider whether even the modest con-
ception of the Kroger rule that the ALI sought to codify is indeed
worth preserving. I conclude that it is not and that the only concep-
tion of the Kroger rule worth codifying is the minimal conception that
is limited to Kroger’s facts, which in fact is codified by the ALI’s pro-
posed § 1367.
3. Id. (footnote omitted).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
5. Indeed, it codifies a broader conception of the Kroger rule than that stated by Professor
Hartnett. According to his just-quoted formulation, the Kroger rule denies “supplemental juris-
diction over claims by plaintiffs against third-party defendants impleaded by defendants.” Hart-
nett, supra note 1, at 651. As discussed in Part I of this Essay, one of the problems of the current
§ 1367 is that, absent a strained construction, it forbids supplemental jurisdiction even of claims
by plaintiffs against third-party defendants impleaded by plaintiffs.
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I.  WHICH KROGER RULE?
The current § 1367 codifies what might be called the robust con-
ception of the Kroger rule. In the unqualified way that distinguishes
the prospective effect of a statute from that of a precedent, it man-
dates a negative answer to the broadly phrased question with which
the Kroger Court began its opinion: “In an action in which federal ju-
risdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, may the plaintiff assert a
claim against a third-party defendant when there is no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim?”6 But this robust con-
ception of the Kroger rule is almost certainly not the proper concep-
tion, if the aim is fidelity to the facts and reasoning of Kroger.
This is evident when one considers the factual situations that the
Kroger Court did not address. Kroger did not involve a plaintiff
whose claim against an already impleaded third-party defendant was
asserted in reaction to that third-party defendant’s prior assertion of a
claim directly against the plaintiff under Rule 14(a)[6].7 Once the
plaintiff is placed in a defensive posture by the assertion of the third-
party defendant’s claim against the plaintiff, the plaintiff has an obli-
gation under Rule 13(a) to assert against the third-party defendant
(now an “opposing party” within the terms of Rule 13(a)) any claim
the plaintiff has that arises from the same transaction or occurrence as
the third-party defendant’s claim against the plaintiff.8 Kroger had no
occasion to address whether its bar on supplemental jurisdiction over
claims by plaintiffs against impleaded third-party defendants applied
even when the plaintiff’s claim is a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a).
Nor did Kroger involve a plaintiff against whom had been as-
serted a claim alleging some liability with respect to which the plain-
tiff might have a right of indemnity or contribution. This might be a
claim asserted against the plaintiff by a third-party defendant under
6. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367 (1978).
7. Rule 14(a) consists of ten unenumerated sentences that differ considerably in their op-
erative significance. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). For convenience I refer to these individual sentences
by bracketed number based on their location within the sequence of Rule 14(a) overall. Thus I
refer to the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) as “Rule 14(a)[6].” Rule 14(a)[6] authorizes the asser-
tion of a claim by the third-party defendant against the plaintiff, provided that the claim arises
out of “the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim against the
third-party plaintiff.” The “third-party plaintiff” is the original defendant, who now wears two
hats in the litigation after invoking Rule 14(a)[1] to implead the third-party defendant by the
filing and service of a third-party complaint.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
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Rule 14(a)[6], as just described, or it might be a claim asserted by the
original defendant as a compulsory or permissive counterclaim under
Rule 13(a) or Rule 13(b), or it might even be a cross-claim asserted
against the plaintiff by a coplaintiff, generally (but not necessarily) as
a reaction to some claim having first been asserted under Rule 13 or
Rule 14 against the coplaintiff, prompting the coplaintiff to cross-
claim for indemnity or contribution. As a procedural matter it is clear
that a plaintiff thus placed in a defensive posture has the right to im-
plead new parties as third-party defendants who may be liable to in-
demnify the plaintiff for the liability asserted against the plaintiff.9
Kroger had no occasion to address whether its bar on supplemental
jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against impleaded third-party de-
fendants applied even when the plaintiff was asserting claims not
against existing third-party defendants but rather against new third-
party defendants that the plaintiff itself, as a “defending party,” was
seeking to implead into the action.
Because Kroger placed particular emphasis on the circumstance
that there was “factual similarity” but no “logical dependence” be-
tween the claim asserted by the plaintiff against the third-party de-
fendant and the only other claim asserted10 (that between the plaintiff
and original defendant), there is good reason to conclude that the
Kroger rule was not intended to foreclose ancillary jurisdiction over
such “logically dependent” claims as a plaintiff’s compulsory counter-
claim against a third-party defendant, or a plaintiff’s claim for indem-
nity or contribution from a third-party defendant that the plaintiff it-
self sought to implead. Thus an appropriately modest conception of
the Kroger rule is tied to and limited by the facts of Kroger. Such a
modest conception does not foreclose the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over claims in diversity cases by plaintiffs against third-
party defendants, when those claims are asserted as compulsory coun-
terclaims or new third-party claims by plaintiffs who have been placed
in a defensive posture.11 The ALI’s proposed statute’s use of much
9. Rule 14(b) expressly authorizes the plaintiff to implead third-party defendants in re-
sponse to a counterclaim, and Rule 14(a)[1] by its terms applies generically to allow impleader
of a third-party defendant by a “defending party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a), 14(b).
10. 437 U.S. at 376 (noting that the respondent’s claim against the petitioner is entirely
separate from and not dependent on resolution of the primary lawsuit).
11. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 2, at 17 (1998) [hereinafter ALI T.D. NO. 2] (lamenting the application of § 1367(b)
to frustrate plaintiffs who are in a defensive position to implead third parties or assert compul-
sory counterclaims against third-party defendants); id. at 27–28 (noting that legal commentators
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different language than the current § 1367 to restrict the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases was intended, inter alia,12
to codify this modest conception of the Kroger rule, rather than the
robust conception codified by the current statute.
Professor Hartnett points out that although the ALI’s statute
purports to preserve the Kroger rule, and indeed would generate the
Kroger Court’s result when applied to the precise facts of that case,
this depends on an idiosyncrasy of the Kroger facts.13 His point is a
substantial one, because it holds even under the modest conception of
the Kroger rule just elaborated.
The impleaded third-party defendant against whom the plaintiff
asserted a claim of direct liability happened in Kroger to be a cociti-
zen of both the plaintiff and the original defendant who impleaded
the third-party defendant.14 In the mine run of cases involving claims
by plaintiffs against impleaded third-party defendants, it is far more
likely that the third-party defendant will be a cocitizen of either the
original plaintiff or the original defendant than that it will be a cociti-
zen of both. If the impleaded party is a cocitizen of the original de-
fendant but not of the original plaintiff, there is no Kroger problem.
The same diversity that permitted the plaintiff to sue the original de-
fendant in federal court also will support the plaintiff’s added claim
against the third-party defendant.15 But if the impleaded party is a co-
citizen of the original plaintiff, then what the Kroger rule (even when
and some district courts have declined to construe § 1367(b) as barring supplemental jurisdic-
tion of reactive claims by plaintiffs as counterclaimants or third-party claimants).
12. See infra Parts II and III (discussing the ALI’s additional motivation to change the lan-
guage of the current § 1367 to better cohere with and exemplify the claim-specific nature of fed-
eral jurisdiction).
13. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 653–54.
14. 437 U.S. at 369 (noting that Owen was both incorporated in Nebraska, where the origi-
nal defendant was located, and had its principal place of business in Iowa, home to the respon-
dent).
15. The plaintiff’s claim against the third-party defendant might depend upon the avail-
ability of supplemental jurisdiction for a reason other than a lack of diversity, if the amount of
the claim against the third-party defendant is for less than the jurisdictional amount required by
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994), which is presently an amount in excess of $75,000. Under the current
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994), this supplemental jurisdiction would be unavailable. Under
the ALI’s proposed statute, § 1367(c)(2), supplemental jurisdiction would be permitted, pro
tanto overruling the rule against aggregation of the amount in controversy established by Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at 67–68
(discussing the rationale for extending supplemental jurisdiction to related claims against addi-
tional defendant and plaintiff parties). Professor Hartnett notes this point, Hartnett, supra note
1, at 649 n.10, but does not question this feature of the ALI’s revision of § 1367. He is concerned
about the fate of Kroger, but (at least for present purposes) not the fate of Zahn.
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modestly conceived) forbids—the exercise of supplemental jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the claim by the original plaintiff against the nondi-
verse third-party defendant—the ALI’s proposed revision of § 1367
would permit.
This follows from the way in which the ALI statute would codify
the Kroger rule. It bars supplemental jurisdiction in diversity litiga-
tion only when the sole basis for supplemental jurisdiction is a juris-
dictionally self-sufficient or “freestanding” claim that is “asserted in
the same pleading” as the jurisdictionally insufficient claim that re-
quires supplemental jurisdiction. If that jurisdictionally insufficient
claim is related (in the constitutional sense that both claims are part
of the same “case or controversy,” broadly conceived) to a free-
standing claim asserted in the pleading of some other party, supple-
mental jurisdiction is permitted—subject to the discretion of the dis-
trict court to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
according to the standards of § 1367(d) of the ALI’s proposed statute.
If the plaintiff and the third-party defendant are citizens of State A
and only State A, and the original defendant is a citizen of State B
and only State B, then the defendant’s claim as third-party plaintiff
impleading the third-party defendant (assuming it satisfied the diver-
sity statute’s amount-in-controversy requirement) is itself a free-
standing claim. It is within the district court’s diversity jurisdiction
under § 1332, not its supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, and in-
deed could be litigated in the federal courts as a separately filed law-
suit. Except in the highly unusual circumstance in which the plaintiff’s
claim against the third-party defendant is unrelated to the plaintiff’s
claim against the original defendant (and hence to the original defen-
dant’s indemnity claim impleading the third-party defendant), the
plaintiff’s claim against the third-party defendant will qualify for sup-
plemental jurisdiction under the ALI’s statute based on the relation-
ship between that claim and the original defendant’s freestanding
claim as third-party plaintiff against a fully diverse third-party defen-
dant.16  Elsewhere I was more cautious and more accurate. “As ap-
16. My commentary accompanying the ALI statute failed to address this point, notwith-
standing my anticipation of just the scenario that Professor Hartnett has identified as problem-
atic. In Comment a-9, I hypothesized “the prototypical situation, where P of State A files in fed-
eral district court a complaint in which P joins two state-law claims arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence, one against D1 of State B and one against D2 of State A,” and speci-
fied that each claim was for more than the diversity statute’s jurisdictional amount. ALI T.D.
NO. 2, supra note 11, at 45–46. I pointed out that the ALI’s statute withdrew supplemental juris-
diction over P’s claim against cocitizen D2, whether the claim was asserted originally or by an
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plied to the actual joinder of claims that occurred in the Kroger case,
[ALI § 1367(c)] produces the same result as that reached under deci-
sional law by the Supreme Court, and as would be produced by appli-
cation of present § 1367(b).”17
[U]nlike current law, T.D. No. 2 preserves Kroger’s precise applica-
tion of the rule of complete diversity without restricting supplemen-
tal jurisdiction of claims asserted by plaintiffs who have been placed
in a defensive posture. Under T.D. No. 2 such a plaintiff may invoke
supplemental jurisdiction to implead third-party defendants in its
own right, and to assert a compulsory counterclaim against a third-
party defendant who has chosen to assert a claim directly against the
plaintiff.18
These qualifications, I hasten to add, were not intended to disguise or
conceal the tension between the ALI’s statute and Kroger that Pro-
fessor Hartnett has discovered and that I overlooked. They adverted
only to the compatibility with Kroger’s “actual” facts, and with a
“precise” application of the Kroger rule, of a modest rather than ro-
bust conception of that rule, understood as one that does not fore-
amendment of the complaint after P had first filed suit against D1 alone. Id. at 46. Next I “sup-
pose[d] that in response to P’s original complaint against D1 alone, D1 impleads D2 as a third-
party defendant under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. But then I nod-
ded.
I declared that “D1’s third-party claim against D2 is a supplemental claim,” id., but as
Professor Hartnett correctly points out, it is not. D1’s claim against D2 is a freestanding claim,
given the previous assumption that D1 is a citizen of State A and D2 is a citizen of State B, ab-
sent some unmentioned caveat that D1’s third-party claim against D2 was for less than the ju-
risdictional amount required by the diversity statute. Thus I erred in concluding that a claim
later asserted by P1 directly against its cocitizen D2 “would have to be dismissed for lack of
supplemental jurisdiction” on account of the combined effect of the ALI’s § 1367(a)(3) and
§ 1367(c). Id. at 47. These provisions would not bar supplemental jurisdiction over P’s claim
against D2 if D2 has first been impleaded by D1, because the third-party claim by D1 against D2
is a freestanding claim (given their diversity of citizenship and assuming the requisite amount is
in controversy). P’s original freestanding claim against D1 is no longer the only freestanding
claim in the litigation. P’s subsequent claim against D2 is a supplemental claim because it is part
of the same “case or controversy” as D1’s freestanding claim against D2, and not only because it
is (also) part of the same case or controversy as P’s original claim against D1. As such, the ALI
statute permits (but does not require) supplemental jurisdiction to be exercised over P’s added
claim against the impleaded D2. This makes misleading my conclusion that the ALI statute
“protects the rule of complete diversity from such an ‘end run.’” See Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at 47. On the hypothesized
facts of Comment a-9 of ALI T.D. No. 2, the statute’s protection against such an “end run” re-
quires the informed exercise of the judicial discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction that is
conferred by the ALI’s § 1367(d).
17. ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at 63 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at xxii (emphasis added).
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close supplemental jurisdiction over claims asserted by plaintiffs who
have been placed in a defensive posture.
II.  NOW WHAT?
Professor Hartnett draws a parallel between the “potential to
produce troubling unintended consequences” that he finds in the
ALI’s proposed statute and the problems of construction that have
arisen under the present § 1367.19 He concludes that “drafting a sup-
plemental jurisdiction statute remains treacherous,”20 an observation I
heartily endorse,21 but he does not take a position on what should be
done next. There are two obvious alternatives. The first is to abandon
the ALI proposal, on the theory that continuing to bail and patch the
current statute is better than depending on the ALI’s craft to provide
a safer passage across treacherous waters. The second is to redraft the
ALI statute to avoid the conflict with Kroger identified by Professor
Hartnett, if that can be done in a way that leaves the rest of the pro-
posed new statute intact and seaworthy. But there is also a third al-
ternative, which is to reconsider just how much of Kroger is worth
preserving. This third alternative leads to the conclusion that the
ALI’s proposed statute is best left unchanged.
I think the problems with the current statute are sufficiently per-
vasive, and sufficiently rooted in problems of structure rather than
detail, that the first alternative should be rejected out of hand. It
would unduly prolong this Essay to restate here the extensive discus-
sion of these problems that I wrote as an introduction to the draft
proposing the ALI’s new § 1367 22 and have elaborated elsewhere.23
19. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 649.
20. Id. at 657.
21. Construing a supplemental jurisdiction statute—or at least the current one—is also
proving treacherous. See John B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts:
The State of the Union of Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (criticizing
current law’s regulation of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases by reference to specifi-
cally enumerated joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and discussing frequent
misunderstanding of current law in recent decisions of the federal courts of appeals).
22. See ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at xv–xxv (giving an overview of the Tentative
Draft); id. at 11–20 (providing the general background to proposals to change § 1367); id. at 20–
30 (compiling the literature and cases on the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine as well as sum-
marizing the technical and conceptual problems).
23. See John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When
Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1831–32 (1998) [hereinafter
Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction] (describing the claim-specific nature of federal jurisdiction); John
B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress Report
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The ALI’s statute seeks not only to improve upon the current § 1367
in a number of specific respects, but also to improve the understand-
ing of federal jurisdiction in general. It seeks to rectify a conceptual
incoherence in the structure of federal jurisdiction by articulating and
exemplifying the fundamental proposition that federal jurisdiction is
“claim-specific” rather than “action-specific.”24 It also would squarely
confront and resolve the most acute of the technical problems that
have arisen under the current statute.25
I therefore much prefer the second alternative to the first. The
fundamental difference between the current § 1367 and the ALI’s
§ 1367 is that the latter restricts supplemental jurisdiction in diversity
cases by referring to types of claims rather than types of joinder. Part
III returns to the conceptual ambitions of the ALI’s proposed statute
in order to justify the importance of this “claim-specific” approach. It
then proposes new language that if added to the ALI’s statute would
alleviate Professor Hartnett’s concerns without impairing the concep-
tual ambition and technical operation of the rest of the statute.
Part IV summarizes an argument I have not previously pub-
lished, but that I now believe needs to made. Unfortunately a full dis-
section and detailed examination of the Kroger case is beyond the
scope of this Essay. Here I merely propose that a fresh look at the
Kroger rule reveals that it rests on two propositions, one fundamental
and one derivative, and that in current conditions a statutory grant of
supplemental jurisdiction should cement into law only the fundamen-
tal proposition. This leads me to conclude that the ALI statute is best
left as is. The concerns that led to Kroger’s derivative principle do not
justify perpetuating the Kroger rule except according to the most nar-
on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 35–41 (1998) [hereinafter Oakley,
Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction] (explaining the ALI’s proposed revision of § 1367); John
B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project,
31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 936–45 (1998) [hereinafter Oakley, Prospectus] (analyzing issues
meriting reform in § 1367).
24. The distinction between a “claim-specific” and an “action-specific” model of federal
jurisdiction is elaborated in Part III.
25. Professor Hartnett adverts to an expanding circuit split over the proper construction of
the current § 1367 as applied to the joinder to diversity litigation of “represented members of a
class action.” Hartnett, supra note 1, at 648. Actually the relevant cases go beyond the class-
action context and divide as to the jurisdictional status of additional plaintiffs joined individually
under Rule 20 as well as collectively under Rule 23. Oakley, Prospectus, supra note 23, at 942.
The ALI’s proposed § 1367(c)(1)–(2) would expressly authorize supplemental jurisdiction in
diversity cases over claims by or against unnamed class members and over claims by or against
additional individual plaintiffs or defendants to cure a lack of a sufficient amount in contro-
versy, but not to cure a lack of diversity of citizenship. ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at 65–70.
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row permissible conception of that rule, which limits its applicability
to the facts of the Kroger case.
III.  CAN THE ALI’S STATUTE BE FIXED WITHOUT
ALTERING ITS STRUCTURE?
Two strategic choices determined the structure of the ALI’s stat-
ute: first, to make the statute expressly claim-based rather than ac-
tion-based and second, to preserve the full advantages of the present
§ 1367. Early in the evolution of the ALI’s Federal Judicial Code Re-
vision Project, the ALI had to decide whether the thrust of the pro-
ject should be direct revision of the various statutes that in confused
and incoherent terms grant original jurisdiction to the district courts
at the level of the action rather than the claim. This approach was re-
jected as even more treacherous than reform of the supplemental ju-
risdiction statute. Both the general and the more specialized jurisdic-
tional statutes refer, often redundantly, to various constellations of
parties, issues, interests, and governing law that in virtue of their fed-
eral character bring cases within the original jurisdiction of the district
courts.26 A subtle and complex set of secondary meanings now govern
these statutes’ application, and any attempt at comprehensive recodi-
fication of the district courts’ original jurisdiction would proceed at
great risk of creating unintended consequences. The ALI instead de-
cided to improve understanding of the statutes more conservatively,
without amending them or affecting their essential scope, by using a
new supplemental jurisdiction statute to clarify the procedural con-
nection between civil disputes and their eligibility for adjudication by
a federal district court. The ALI’s proposed new § 1367 seeks to fos-
ter such a reconceptualization by treating the “claim” rather than the
“civil action” as the fundamental unit of civil litigation.27
A “claim” is understood to be an assertion by one claiming party
of a right to some form of judicial relief as to one defending party. In
this jurisdictional sense, a “claim” is defined in terms both of a par-
ticular pair of parties and of a particular legal theory of the right to
26. As the ALI noted,
Sections 1331 and 1332 refer to “civil actions,” as do most other sections of Chapter
85 of Title 28, where most statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the courts are
located. Sections 1333(1) and 1334 of Title 28 refer to jurisdiction of “cases.” Some
provisions refer alternatively (e.g. § 1337) or exclusively (§ 1358) to jurisdiction of
“proceedings” or “suits and proceedings” (§ 1333(2), § 1345).
ALI T.D. NO. 2, supra note 11, at 29–30.
27. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 26.
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relief. A “civil action” is understood to be a judicial proceeding for
relief of a civil nature, commenced by the pleading of one or more
claims, and to which other claims may be joined in the conduct of the
litigation. A “civil action,” thus conceived, is simply a generic, trans-
substantive means or “form of action” for seeking judicial relief of a
civil nature. The intrinsic scope of a “claim” is limited by the bipolar
nature of the claim and the particular legal theory upon which it is
based. There is no intrinsic scope of a “civil action,” which is contin-
gent on the decisions of the parties, shaped and limited by the rules of
pleading, joinder, jurisdiction, and preclusion, as to which claims are
submitted simultaneously for enforcement at one time by one judge
(or panel of judges, in the rare instance where jurisdiction is vested in
a three-judge district court). For purposes of federal jurisdiction,
however, the scope of the claims that may be adjudicated in a single
“civil action” is limited by the intrinsic scope of the constitutional
concept of a “case or controversy,”28 which permits federal judicial
power to be exercised not only over designated categories of claims
but also, and only, over such other claims as may be transactionally
related to and joined in a single civil action with claims that qualify
categorically for federal jurisdiction.29
The structure of the ALI’s statute also was influenced by a sec-
ond strategic choice. There was much to recommend the old law of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as it operated before Finley v.
United States30 called into question the legitimacy of that whole
framework of nonstatutory jurisdictional doctrine.31 Since Finley did
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 1858 (rethinking jurisdictional terminol-
ogy within a claim-specific model of federal jurisdiction).
30. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
31. The Federal Courts Study Committee discussed pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as
follows:
The terms “pendent” and “ancillary” jurisdiction refer to the authority of federal
courts to hear and determine, without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction,
claims related to matters properly before them. These supplemental forms of jurisdic-
tion, which may be exercised in the discretion of the federal courts, enable them to
take full advantage of the rules on claim and party joinder to deal economically—in
single rather than multiple litigation—with matters arising from the same transaction
or occurrence. Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction may be used with respect either to
additional claims between parties already before the courts (as with compulsory
counterclaims) or to claims bringing in new parties (as with impleader of a third-party
defendant).
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court raise doubts about the scope of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction under existing federal statutes. As a result, a litigant with
related claims against two different parties—one within and one outside original fed-
eral jurisdiction—may have to choose between (1) splitting the claims and bringing
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not seriously question the constitutionality of this framework, but
only the lack of express legislative authorization,32 one approach seri-
ously considered in the drafting of a new supplemental jurisdiction
statute was to reduce rather than to expand the detail of present
§ 1367. Such a statute would be a paradigm of simplicity, since it need
only consist of an express legislative delegation of discretionary
power authorizing the federal courts to shape and apply doctrines of
supplemental jurisdiction as they see fit. This approach was rejected,
however, out of concern that the trend of judicial thinking, at least at
the Supreme Court, would lead to a significant contraction rather
than expansion of the supplemental jurisdiction authorized by present
§ 1367. Thus the preferred approach, ultimately embodied by the
ALI’s statute, was meant to accomplish two aims. First, it was to pre-
serve the benefits of present § 1367: plenary supplemental jurisdic-
tion, to the limits of Article III, granted in federal-question cases; a
partial withdrawal of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases to
preserve the rule of complete diversity as a threshold limitation on
access to federal court; and express discretion, cabined by statutory
standards, to decline supplemental jurisdiction in appropriate cases.
At the same time, it was intended to clarify the claim-specific nature
of federal jurisdiction and curtail the scope of supplemental jurisdic-
tion in diversity cases in functional terms rather than by reference to
specific joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33
This strategy produced a complex statute, but one intended to be co-
herent in principle and clear in its application to contested cases.
As discussed in Part I, the robust conception of the Kroger rule
codified by the current § 1367 is unnecessarily restrictive of supple-
mental jurisdiction over claims against third-party defendants as-
duplicative actions in state and federal courts; (2) abandoning one of the claims alto-
gether; or (3) filing the entire case in state court, thus delegating the determination of
federal issues to the state courts. The first alternative wastes judicial resources. The
second is unfair to the claimant. The third forces litigants to bring a wide variety of
federal claims into the state courts and in some cases is unavailable because federal
jurisdiction over the federal aspect is exclusive.
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 47 (1990), quoted in ALI T.D. NO. 2,
supra note 11, at 13–14; see also Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 157–78
(1983) (detailing the historical scope of the pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines and
their constitutional limits); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Ju-
risdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
735, 757–63 (1991) (reviewing the predecessor doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
32. 490 U.S. at 549.
33. Cf. current § 1367 (referring specifically to FED. R. CIV. P. 14, 19, 20, 24).
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serted by plaintiffs in reaction to claims asserted against plaintiffs thus
placed in a defensive posture. The ALI’s § 1367 sought to codify a
more modest conception of the Kroger rule that would not prejudice
plaintiffs who are also, pro tanto, defending parties. Professor Hart-
nett has pointed out, however, that the ALI’s statute also permits
plaintiffs in diversity litigation to invoke supplemental jurisdiction
even as to claims that they have not asserted in a defensive posture.34
I have drafted a new sentence that, if inserted at the beginning of
the ALI’s proposed § 1367(c), would obviate Professor Hartnett’s
concerns without altering the statute’s fundamental structure, and
without inhibiting the availability of supplemental jurisdiction to sup-
port defensively asserted claims by plaintiffs against third-party de-
fendants. New § 1367(c) as thus revised is reprinted below, with the
added language underlined.
(c) Restriction of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity litigation.
The district court shall not have jurisdiction of a supplemental claim
under subsection (b) if that supplemental claim has been asserted by
an original plaintiff against a third party impleaded by an original
defendant and the third party has not asserted a claim against the
original plaintiff, when the only basis for such jurisdiction is that a
claim asserted by the original defendant against the third-party de-
fendant qualifies as a freestanding claim solely on the basis of the ju-
risdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title. When the jurisdic-
tion of a district court over a supplemental claim depends upon a
freestanding claim that is asserted in the same pleading and that
qualifies as a freestanding claim solely on the basis of the jurisdic-
tion conferred by section 1332 of this title, the court shall have juris-
diction of the supplemental claim under subsection (b) only if it—
(1) is asserted representatively by or against a class of additional
unnamed parties; or
(2) would be a freestanding claim on the basis of section 1332 of
this title but for the value of the claim; or
(3) has been joined to the action by the intervention of a party
whose joinder is not indispensable to the litigation of the action.
IV.  HOW MUCH OF THE KROGER RULE IS WORTH SAVING?
Thus, the ALI’s statute could be rewritten, without substantially
disrupting its structure, to codify the modest conception of the Kroger
34. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 654–55.
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rule. The remaining question is whether even that modest conception
ought to be retained in preference to one that is narrower still.
Kroger sought to defend congressional limitation of the scope of
general diversity jurisdiction against the expansive effect of rules of
supplemental jurisdiction.35 It thus fortified two principles. The first
principle, which I call Kroger’s “core” principle, was to preserve the
rule of complete diversity as applied at the commencement of litiga-
tion. This entails a prohibition against using supplemental jurisdiction
to remedy a lack of complete diversity at the outset of litigation.
Without such a limitation on supplemental jurisdiction, the rule of
complete diversity codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)36 would be a dead
letter. The Kroger Court itself acknowledged that this core principle
was its background concern.
If, as the Court of Appeals thought, a “common nucleus of op-
erative fact” were the only requirement for ancillary jurisdiction in a
diversity case, there would be no principled reason why the respon-
dent in this case could not have joined her cause of action against
Owen in her original complaint as ancillary to her claim against
OPPD. Congress’s requirement of complete diversity would thus
have been evaded completely.37
But the Kroger Court’s central concern was not this core princi-
ple. The Court was, rather, concerned with what I call Kroger’s ex-
tended principle: to protect against the core principle being “evaded”
indirectly rather than “disregarded” directly.38 Thus, Kroger barred
supplemental jurisdiction from supporting a claim by a plaintiff
against a cocitizen even after that cocitizen had been impleaded by
the original defendant as a third-party defendant. The extended prin-
ciple required rejection of “the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in
this case,” under which “a plaintiff could defeat the statutory re-
35. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374–77 (1978).
36. As codified, the rule of complete diversity is subject to the limited exception of
§ 1332(a)(3). This exception expressly allows aliens to be “additional parties,” and has been held
to allow aliens to be both plaintiffs and defendants, provided that the claims between the aliens
are joined to claims between completely diverse citizens of different states. See, e.g., Dresser
Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“The . . . Insurers alternatively argue . . . that even if section 1332(a)(3) grants jurisdiction when
aliens are present on both sides of a case, they cannot be considered ‘additional parties’ . . . . We
disagree.”). See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JOHN B. OAKLEY, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 159 n.6 (10th ed. 1999).
37. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374–75.
38. “The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Con-
gress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded.” Id. at 374.
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quirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only
those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for
them to implead nondiverse defendants.”39 In an accompanying foot-
note, the Court declared that “[t]his is not an unlikely hypothesis,
since a defendant in a tort suit such as this one would surely try to
limit his liability by impleading any joint tortfeasors for indemnity or
contribution.”40 This concern could not be met by application of “28
U.S.C. § 1359, which forbids collusive attempts to create federal juris-
diction,” because “[t]here is nothing necessarily collusive about a
plaintiff’s selectively suing only those tortfeasors of diverse citizen-
ship, or about the named defendants’ desire to implead joint tortfea-
sors. Nonetheless, the requirement of complete diversity would be
eviscerated by such a course of events.”41
Thus the core principle of Kroger dictates only the reaffirmation
of the rule of complete diversity as originally articulated in Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss,42 but the extended principle impelled the Kroger
Court to fashion what Professor Hartnett and I refer to as “the
Kroger rule,” forbidding (at least in some circumstances) supplemen-
tal jurisdiction from supporting claims by plaintiffs against third-party
defendants. Two conceptions of the Kroger rule were previously dis-
cussed in Part I. The robust conception codified by the current § 1367
flatly prohibits any supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs
against third-party defendants. The modest conception that the ALI’s
§ 1367 sought imperfectly to codify, and that would be better served
by the revised version of the ALI’s § 1367(c) proposed in Part III,
authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over claims by defensively pos-
tured plaintiffs against third-party defendants.43 Both of these concep-
tions of the Kroger rule depend upon the vitality of Kroger’s ex-
tended principle. But there is a third conception of the Kroger rule,
which I call the “minimal” conception, that depends only on Kroger’s
core principle.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 374–75 n.17.
41. Id.
42. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). The scope and structure of the rule of complete di-
versity as articulated in Strawbridge is discussed at length in Oakley, Integrating Supplemental
Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 45–52.
43. The just-quoted language of Kroger itself about the facially justifiable and hence non-
collusive nature of claims for indemnity or contribution by parties defending against tort claims
provides additional support for the argument in Part I that the reasoning of the Kroger case bet-
ter supports the modest rather than the robust conception of the Kroger rule.
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The minimal conception of the Kroger rule forbids supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant
only when no other claim in the action could independently be adju-
dicated in the exercise of the district court’s diversity jurisdiction ex-
cept a claim asserted by the original plaintiff against an original de-
fendant in the fully diverse posture of the litigation as commenced.
This of course was exactly the situation posed by Kroger itself. The
ostensibly predictable third-party claim by which the original defen-
dant impleaded the third-party defendant was no more supported by
independent diversity jurisdiction than was the ensuing claim asserted
against the third-party defendant by the plaintiff. To allow supple-
mental jurisdiction in this situation necessarily infringes on Kroger’s
core principle—the need to fortify the rule of complete diversity by
barring supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims based solely
on the diversity between at least one plaintiff and one defendant at
the commencement of the litigation.
Unlike both the robust and the modest versions of the Kroger
rule, the minimal version does not depend on Kroger’s extended prin-
ciple. For this reason, the minimal version is preferable; there seem to
me to be several good reasons to question the vitality of Kroger’s ex-
tended principle in modern circumstances.
First. Kroger dealt with nonstatutory supplemental jurisdiction.44
Now that supplemental jurisdiction has been codified, the appropriate
degree of restriction of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases is
now being debated as a matter of policy, not as a matter of the sepa-
ration of the judicial and legislative powers. The Kroger Court had to
consider what it should do judicially in the administration of doctrines
of precedent, almost wholly unblessed by statute, that threatened ero-
sion of a congressional restriction on the scope of the general diver-
sity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress itself need not be so
bashful about its authority. The constitutionality of “minimal” rather
than “complete” diversity as the basis for federal jurisdiction has long
been established,45 and to my knowledge that proposition is now be-
44. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370 (“[T]he Court of Appeals relied upon the doctrine of an-
cillary jurisdiction, whose contours it believed were defined by . . . Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966) . . . .”).
45. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court declared:
The interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, applies where there are “Two or more ad-
verse claimants, of diverse citizenship . . . .” This provision has been uniformly con-
strued to require only “minimal diversity,” that is, diversity of citizenship between
two or more claimants, without regard to the circumstance that other rival claimants
may be co-citizens.
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yond question. Thus Congress should be persuaded by functional
concerns alone in deciding how broadly to permit supplemental juris-
diction to be exercised in diversity cases, unconstrained by concerns
of institutional authority.
Second. The Kroger Court was dealing with a case that fell at the
intersection of two lines of precedent, one dealing with “pendent” ju-
risdiction, and the other dealing with “ancillary” jurisdiction. The re-
lationship between these two doctrines was complex and unsettled
and is now a matter only of historical interest. The Kroger Court re-
versed the holding of the court below that extended ancillary jurisdic-
tion to the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party defendant,46 but
chose not to resolve whether the lower court had properly analyzed
the question as one of ancillary as opposed to pendent jurisdiction.47
The dissent in Kroger had no difficulty conceiving of the question as
one of ancillary jurisdiction and called for the rule of complete diver-
sity to be accommodated on a case-by-case basis through discretion-
ary judicial administration of ancillary jurisdiction.48 One reason for
the majority’s reluctance to accept this more flexible rule of decision
may have been the fact that although discretionary application of
pendent jurisdiction was well established when Kroger was decided,
the scope and standards of judicial discretion to decline ancillary ju-
risdiction were far from clear.49 Now that the categorical issue has
been statutorily resolved by an omnibus grant of supplemental juris-
diction, it is clear that the same degree and the same standards of ju-
dicial discretion pertain to all forms of supplemental jurisdiction.
There is no longer a concern that if supplemental jurisdiction extends
to the claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant, it must be
exercised automatically. Supplemental jurisdiction over such a claim
need not be forbidden altogether in order to forestall ad hoc evasion
of the rule of complete diversity. Concerns of the sort that troubled
the Kroger Court can now be addressed by judicial exercise of statu-
tory authority to decline supplemental jurisdiction in particular cases.
Third. The sweeping reform of the tort law of most states, dis-
carding the absolute defense of contributory negligence in favor of
Id. at 530–31.
46. 437 U.S. at 375–77.
47. Id. at 370 n.8.
48. Id. at 383 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
49. For a roughly contemporaneous discussion of the muddled law pertaining to discre-
tionary exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, see Matasar, supra note 31, at 184–88.
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the proportional defense of comparative negligence, has made it in-
creasingly important to permit unimpeded joinder and adjudication of
the entire web of comparative negligence claims that may initially be
asserted against third-party defendants. It would be bizarre in these
circumstances to enforce a regime of supplemental jurisdiction in
which a plaintiff engaged in complex, multicornered litigation about
relative fault and liability could end up without a binding judgment as
to the rights of the plaintiff against a proportionally liable third-party
defendant.50
Fourth. Kroger was poorly reasoned even under the principles of
law then applicable, and for sheer lack of judicial craft merits minimal
deference. The Supreme Court decided Kroger late in its 1977 term,
when several other decisions of more obvious public importance were
occupying its attention.51 The majority’s opinion followed the basic
50. The problems of applying Rule 14 in the era of comparative negligence merit an article
of their own, which appears to be yet unwritten. Those problems are procedural as well as juris-
dictional, because there is considerable variation in state law as to whether the right to establish
the proportional fault of a joint tortfeasor is in the nature of a right to contribution. When it is
not, Rule 14 does not clearly apply but has sometimes sensibly been stretched to bridge what
would otherwise be a serious procedural gap. See Tietz v. Blackner, 157 F.R.D. 510, 514 (D.
Utah 1994) (allowing joinder under Rule 14 because “although there would not be ‘liability
over’ in the classical sense of indemnity or contribution” such claims “would, in substance, have
the same legal effect . . . of Rule 14(a)” and “[n]ot to allow the joinder under Rule 14 would
create confusion, complexity, and convolution”); see also Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27
S.W.3d 775, 779 (Ky. 2000) (discussing the applicability to comparative negligence claims of
Rule 14 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1084 (N.Y. 1989) (permitting the defendant DES manufacturer to implead other manufac-
turers as third-party defendants to determine their proportional liability); Martin v. Abbott
Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (same); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52–53
(Wis. 1984) (same). See generally 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 1446, 1448 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 2001)
(“And even when there is a substantive right that creates secondary liability in favor of a third-
party plaintiff, it must be remembered that the court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a
third-party complaint.”); Julie O. McClellan, Apportioning Liability to Nonparties in Kentucky
Tort Actions: A Natural Extension of Comparative Fault or a Phantom Scapegoat for Negligent
Defendants?, 82 KY. L.J. 789, 812–33 (1994) (analyzing case law after Kentucky’s adoption of
comparative fault principles, including a discussion on apportioning liability, inter alia, to third-
party defendants, tortfeasors who were named and later dismissed from the action, and parties
that could not be formally joined); David W. Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percentages: A Sim-
plified Vocabulary of Comparative Fault, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 831, 831–55 (2001) (discussing
various substantive and procedural challenges facing jurisdictions that have chosen to abandon
contributory negligence and have adopted some form of a comparative fault regime).
51. The list of important cases decided between June 21, 1978 (the date of decision in
Kroger), and the end of term on July 3, 1978, is a long one. The following four cases give a flavor
of what was on the Court’s table and have been selected because in each, the divisions within
the Court led to the case being decided without a majority opinion as to all issues: FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (July 3, 1978) (free speech and the “seven dirty words”); Lockett
OAKLEY1.DOC 01/25/02 3:24 PM
2001] KROGER REDUX 681
reasoning of the dissenting judge in the court below,52 with little atten-
tion to or enthusiasm for the Supreme Court’s unique capacity, and
indeed responsibility, to bring clarity and coherence to the doctrines
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that were being developed and
applied on an ad hoc basis by the lower federal courts. It ended up in
an analytical box of its own creation. On the one hand, the plaintiff’s
claim was asserted only after the third-party defendant had already
been joined by another party’s pleading.53 That was consistent with a
classification of the situation as one of the availability of ancillary ju-
risdiction. But ancillary jurisdiction was not clearly established to ad-
mit of discretionary application. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s
claim was asserted in the complaint, albeit by amendment,54 and this
seemed to call for application of principles of pendent jurisdiction.
Although permitting district courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over claims asserted in the complaint (either originally or by amend-
ment) would be subject to district court discretion, this would reduce
the rule of complete diversity to a discretionary judicial doctrine
rather than a threshold statutory requirement. The Court ended up
ignoring the palpable ancillary characteristics of the situation it con-
fronted. Instead, it insisted that because it lacked the power to assert
pendent jurisdiction over a complaint joining nondiverse as well as
diverse defendants, it also lacked the power to assert ancillary juris-
diction when the problematic claim was not, in fact, part of an original
complaint that as filed was indisputably within federal jurisdiction.55
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (July 3, 1978) (death penalty); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (June 28, 1978) (affirmative action in higher education); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1 (June 26, 1978) (media access to correctional institutions).
52. See Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 430–31 (8th Cir. 1977)
(Bright, J., dissenting), rev’d, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Justice Bright maintained:
I believe that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Aldinger v. Howard . . . and
cases such as American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn . . . require that we dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction. . . . I would conclude that Congress did not intend that federal
courts take jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a third-party defendant, in the
absence of independent jurisdictional grounds.
Id.
53. 437 U.S. at 367–68.
54. Id. at 368.
55. The plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant had already been dismissed under
Rule 54(b) after that defendant had prevailed on a motion for summary judgment, a motion not
decided until after the plaintiff was permitted to amend her complaint to add her claim against
the nondiverse third-party defendant. This sequence of events was noted by the Kroger Court
with no apparent concern that the judgment in favor of the diverse defendant was beyond fed-
eral jurisdiction given the prior conversion of the action into one of incomplete diversity under
the amended complaint. See id. at 367–68 & n.4 (citing the affirmance of the dismissal of the di-
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Had the Court used analysis rather than evasion, it might have
cut through the Gordian knot of classification it faced and rewoven
the threads of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in a much more co-
herent way. It might then have reached the sensible conclusion that
pendent jurisdiction cannot support a complaint initially filed against
incompletely diverse defendants, the jurisdictional bar mooting ques-
tions of judicial discretion. Similarly, it might have reached the no less
sensible conclusion that the later assertion of claims against nondi-
verse parties by a plaintiff engaged in ongoing litigation within federal
diversity jurisdiction presents a question of ancillary, not pendent, ju-
risdiction. There is clearly jurisdictional power over litigation already
proceeding in federal court. The Court could then have clarified the
status of judicial discretion within the law of ancillary jurisdiction by
holding that when subsequently joined claims threaten evasion of the
rule of complete diversity, ancillary jurisdiction should be discretion-
arily declined.
I conclude that only the core principle of the Kroger case clearly
merits codification. The core principle is that a civil action may be
commenced in federal court on the basis of the general diversity stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, only on the basis of complete diversity. This
core principle prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
additional claims by plaintiffs against nondiverse defendants asserted
at the outset of litigation, when the sole basis for supplemental juris-
diction is the relationship between these claims and the claims as-
serted by the plaintiff against diverse defendants. Otherwise the basic
restrictive function of the rule of complete diversity would be eroded
verse defendant in Kroger v. Omaha Public Power District, 523 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975)). An-
other make-weight argument carelessly advanced in Kroger is that “[a] plaintiff cannot complain
if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible claims in a case such as this one,
since it is he who has chosen the federal forum rather than the state forum and must thus accept
its limitations.” Id. at 376. This implies, without any supporting justification or any apparent
source for such justification, that the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction somehow would
have materialized had the plaintiff sued the original defendant in state court, and had the origi-
nal defendant exercised its right to removal. It was not until 1988 that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) was
enacted, which arguably (but not necessarily) addresses the situation of a plaintiff’s attempt in a
removed case to join to the litigation a claim against a nondiverse third-party. See Joan Stein-
man, Postremoval Changes in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law,
and Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 863, 895 (1990) (asserting that although the drafters of Rule 19
“presupposed that there were persons whose joinder would deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the action originally filed,” enacting § 1447(e) was unnecessary because “[c]ase
law does not support this proposition . . . which is inconsistent with the general principle that
once an action has been properly removed, nothing the plaintiff does can defeat federal jurisdic-
tion”).
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by constant recourse to judicial discretion to decide whether a civil
action in which diverse and nondiverse claims are joined in the com-
plaint may nonetheless proceed without the dismissal of the jurisdic-
tionally insufficient claims because the court chooses to exercise its
discretion to permit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
claims against the nondiverse defendants.
The extended principle of the Kroger case does not merit codifi-
cation, except (and even this is debatable) in the form of what I have
called the minimal conception of the Kroger rule. The extended prin-
ciple seeks to bar recourse to supplemental jurisdiction to support
later-added claims by plaintiffs against nondiverse parties that under
the core principle could not have been asserted at the commencement
of the litigation. Its ambition is to protect the rule of complete diver-
sity against evasion by contrivance. It supposes that a plaintiff might
initiate a complete-diversity suit in federal court that would otherwise
have been brought in state court against a combination of diverse and
nondiverse defendants, because the plaintiff hopes that the nondi-
verse defendants will be impleaded by the diverse defendant as third-
party defendants, thereby allowing the plaintiff to invoke supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over the claims it later asserts against its impleaded
cocitizens. I think discretionary judicial denial of supplemental juris-
diction in such cases adequately can curtail such an evasion of the
core principle that supplemental jurisdiction must be subordinate to
the rule of complete diversity.
This reasoning argues against codification of both the robust and
modest conceptions of the Kroger rule that I have discussed.56 The ro-
bust conception of the Kroger rule, which is the conception codified
by the current § 1367, goes beyond the reasoning of Kroger to pro-
hibit supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against third-
party defendants that result from plaintiffs being placed in a defensive
position in the litigation they commenced. But even the modest con-
ception of the Kroger rule that the ALI draft imperfectly codifies,
permitting supplemental jurisdiction with respect to plaintiffs’ claims
asserted in reaction to claims against them, fails to give proper leeway
to federal judges to promote efficient, integrated adjudication of re-
lated claims.
The minimal conception of the Kroger rule—barring supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a third-party defendant
56. See supra Part I.
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when federal power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction depends
solely on the plaintiff’s own assertion of a claim against a diverse de-
fendant—also depends on an extension of the core principle that sup-
plemental jurisdiction cannot cure a lack of complete diversity at the
outset of the litigation. But this minimal conception of the Kroger
rule, which limits its restriction of supplemental jurisdiction to claims
and parties having the jurisdictional status and posture of those in
Kroger itself, differs in a key respect from the robust and modest con-
ceptions of the Kroger rule that I now believe should not be codified.
It preserves symmetry in the jurisdictional posture of the litigation
without regard to which party sues first.
Suppose that there are three parties in a conventional three-
cornered relationship in which each of the three has suffered some
harm for which the others may be liable, or at least that under com-
parative negligence principles any uninjured party may have claims
against the other two for apportionment of fault.
In the Kroger scenario, the three parties involved are A of State
A, B of State B, and AB, a citizen of both State A and State B. None
of these parties can initiate litigation against the other two in federal
court, for lack of complete diversity. The enforcement of the com-
plete-diversity rule, the core principle of the Kroger case, requires
that if suit is nevertheless brought in federal court, as in a suit by A
against B, A not be permitted to invoke supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim added against AB just because AB has been impleaded
by B. All three conceptions of the Kroger rule agree to this extent.57
But in the Hartnett scenario, the three parties involved are A of
State A, B of State B, and AA of State A.58 Now, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1, it is possible for one of the parties to bring a diversity suit
against the other two: B can commence the litigation against A and
AA. If B does so, A of course can invoke supplemental jurisdiction
under every conception of the Kroger rule to cross-claim against co-
57. The conceptions disagree if B not only impleads AB but also counterclaims against A
to establish A’s proportional fault. The robust conception and its codification by the current
§ 1367(b) would still prohibit supplemental jurisdiction over A’s responsive claim against the
impleaded third-party—and according to Professor Hartnett’s interpretation by which a party
joined under Rule 13(h) is deemed to have been joined under Rule 19 or 20, this is true even if
B impleads AB not under Rule 14, but rather under Rule 13(h) as an additional party to a coun-
terclaim against A. The modest and minimal conceptions of the Kroger rule, which would be
codified respectively by the revised ALI statute proposed in Part III or by the ALI statute as
presently worded, both would confer supplemental jurisdiction over a responsive claim by A
against AB as either a counterclaim codefendant or a third-party defendant.
58. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 654.
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citizen AA. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the relationship between A
and AA that results from A suing B, B impleading AA, and A then
asserting a claim against AA now mirrors that which would result if B
instead of A (or AA) had initiated the litigation. I can see no good
reason for federal jurisdiction over this relationship to be available
only if B initiates the litigation, but not A or AA.
FIGURE 1: JURISDICTIONAL POSTURE OF LITIGATION
COMMENCED BY B
   AA
(3) (2)
(1)
        A    B
Claim no. 1 and claim no. 2, both asserted by B against codefendants A and AA, are
freestanding claims. Supplemental jurisdiction exists over claim no. 3, A’s cross-
claim against codefendant AA, under every conception of the Kroger rule.
FIGURE 2: JURISDICTIONAL POSTURE OF LITIGATION
COMMENCED BY A
   AA
(3) (2)
(1)
        A    B
Claim no. 1 by A against B (asserted in the original complaint) and claim no. 2 by B
against AA (asserted in B’s third-party complaint) are both freestanding claims.
Under the minimal conception of the Kroger rule, A may invoke supplemental ju-
risdiction to assert claim no. 3 against third-party defendant AA once AA has been
impleaded by B’s assertion of claim no. 2.
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CONCLUSION
The minimal conception of the Kroger rule actually codified by
the ALI’s proposed § 1367 is the best conception for a supplemental
jurisdiction statute to codify. It is true that the ALI advertised the
modest conception of the Kroger rule in presenting its draft to the
membership, and I am grateful to Professor Hartnett for calling atten-
tion to the discrepancy between the version of the Kroger rule that
was on offer and that which actually was delivered. I have proposed
an amendment that, if inserted in the current ALI draft, would de-
liver a statute that conforms to the ALI’s intention of codifying the
modest conception of the Kroger rule. But the ALI’s unmodified
draft, which codifies instead only the minimal conception of the
Kroger rule, is a better value. Thus I conclude that the ALI ought to
leave its proposed statute as is, and that Congress should enact the
ALI’s statute in its unmodified form.
